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Abstract
At several points in history, presidents have been tasked with filling vacancies on the Supreme
Court, as it is within their power to do so. Each nomination must be confirmed by the Senate,
who then votes whether to put the nominee on the court or not. As the years have gone on, the
nominees have been selected strategically to pass through the confirmation process, which has
become more politicized. When confirming nominees, the Senate looks at the qualifications of
the nominee, but also bends the rules if needed to better suit their agenda. Two cases of this, one
in 1968 with the nomination of then- Associate Justice Abe Fortas to serve as Chief Justice, and
the other occurring in 2016 when Merrick Garland was nominated to fill a vacancy left by the
death of an Associate Justice. Both cases occurred in election years and were subject to the
Senate’s political games in choosing to confirm each nominee. The Senate’s role in each case has
led to calls for reform to the confirmation process, including to require hearings for each
nominee, regardless of the circumstances.

1
Riding the Bench: The Politics of Nominating and Confirming Justices to the United States
Supreme Court
Many US Presidents have had the opportunity to influence American politics past their
time in office. This opportunity comes from nominating a justice to the Supreme Court, who
serves for the remainder of their life. Today, we have several justices who were nominated
decades ago. Few individuals in the world have the influence that the justices of the US Supreme
Court have. These nine individuals, once confirmed, hold their jobs for life and can impact the
American political sphere for decades after their appointment. Due to their influence, both in the
short and long term, justices must be confirmed through a lengthy and rigorous confirmation
process, facilitated by the Senate. The constitution provides a blueprint for this process and
alludes to the fact that politics should be set aside when holding such hearings to confirm
justices. As with many things carrying an immense amount of influence, politics has crept in and
nominees are chosen strategically with the hopes that they will be confirmed and placed on the
court for decades, advancing the agenda of the president who nominated them long after they
have left office. While there are many instances where nominations have been blocked, there are
two instances in particular that stand out because of their influence on a micro level (the court)
and a macro level (American politics). The cases are: the 1968 resignation of Chief Justice Earl
Warren and the subsequent nomination of Associate Justice Abe Fortas to serve as his successor;
and the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland to fill a vacancy left by a death on the court. Both
cases took place during an election year, have left a lasting impact on the court and its politics,
and have called into question the procedure for confirming nominees to serve as Supreme Court
Justices.
To best analyze both cases and speak to their effects on the nomination and confirmation
processes, it is important to go back to basics and understand the processes. Article 3 of the US
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Constitution establishes the judicial system, more specifically the Supreme Court, in which “the
judicial power of the United States shall be vested”1. Since the country’s founding, the powers
and role of the Supreme Court have shifted. The court does not have original jurisdiction, except
in rare cases, and instead primarily hears appeals from lower courts on cases which contain
important constitutional issues. Judicial review, or the process for judges to review and interpret
laws and the constitution as they see fit, was established in the 1803 ruling in the case Marbury
v. Madison, a landmark case which changed the power of the Supreme Court. Since then, the
court has ruled on several important matters and have provided all citizens with interpretations of
the constitution on several vital issues. Judicial review allows for the Supreme Court to share
their perspective on a specific constitutional issue, while leaving a specific issue open for
interpretation in future cases. The views of the court change over time and are affected by the
justices on the court. It can be argued that the justices who serve on the Supreme Court are some
of the most powerful people in the country because of their lifetime appointments and ability to
interpret the constitution. Justices serve for life, but most retire before their death. They are
appointed to life terms instead of being elected every few years, with the hope that they will
decide cases based on what they truly feel, instead of letting politics creep into their decisions
when it comes time to get re-elected.
While this is largely the case once the justices are seated on the court, nominating and
confirming them is a different story. The constitution gives the president the job to appoint
justices to the Supreme Court. His or her nomination is then confirmed or denied by a vote in the
senate. Prior to the senate voting to confirm a nominee, the judiciary committee confirms the
nominee prior to being given to the senate to vote on. In both stages of their hearings, nominees
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US Constitution, Article 3 Section 1.
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face a rigorous confirmation process and there is often a media circus which coincides with the
hearings. The nine individuals who serve as justices are some of the country’s best legal minds,
with the caveat that they are individuals who can pass through the nomination process. These
individuals are often strategically appointed to their posts. Presidents are aware of this, and they
choose nominees who can pass their confirmation hearings with relative ease. In most cases,
nominees make it easily, but in other cases, as will be covered later, there are issues with the
nominations that prevent a smooth confirmation. In many cases where there are issues in the
process, a political game is played by the senate, who often allows politics to enter their
confirmation hearings. The majority leaders often play a large part in this political game by
dictating the position of the majority party and helping to determine what makes it to the full
sessions for voting. Because of this, it can be argued that the majority leaders have more power
than the president in the confirmation of justices. Many of the nominations to the Supreme Court
occur during election years or times of political contention, which means outside political factors
tend to affect the process in ways which had otherwise not been intended when the constitution
was written.
Some cases of nominees to the Supreme Court, such as the two which I have mentioned
earlier will be closely analyzed here, have broader political implications, such as taking place
during an election year, and have resulted in a shift in the American political landscape, both
immediately and in the years following their occurrences. 1968 was an important year for the
Supreme Court, largely due to the the retirement of Chief Justice Earl Warren, who, “In March
of 1968 had observed his seventy-seventh birthday. Federal judges can retire at full pay at age
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seventy, but retirement is not mandatory at age seventy or at any age”2 He chose 1968 to retire
largely because he was in his late 70s and finally wanted a life away from politics. For nearly his
entire career, Earl Warren held public office, as a district attorney, California Attorney General,
Governor of California, and Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court. With the series of political
mishaps made by the president during 1968, Warren felt as though it was the correct time to
retire. Warren’s retirement “would not become effective until such time as a successor [was]
qualified”3. As Chief Justice, Warren valued continuity, especially in a post with as much
influence as Chief Justice has, so he allowed for the appointment of a successor. He had hoped
Johnson would be the one to nominate a successor, because he wanted to be succeeded by
someone who could continue to favor the liberal opinions and legal environment which he had
created. The necessity for appointing a successor opened a Pandora’s Box of sorts for Supreme
Court nominations, where politics overtook the nomination process and resulted in unintended
consequences for all parties involved. President Johnson was tasked with nominating a successor
for the Chief Justice. He looked no farther than the justices already on the court, and chose to
elevate his longtime friend and confidant, Associate Justice Abe Fortas to the post of Chief
Justice. Fortas was not elevated to the position, and Johnson’s term as president ended before he
could nominate another successor for Chief Justice Warren, leaving that task up to the newly
elected president, Republican Richard Nixon. Nixon nominated Warren Burger, a conservative
federal district court judge. Burger was confirmed, and conservatives have held the post ever
since 1969. This nomination is increasingly important given that the Chief Justice of the
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Robert Shogan. A Question of Judgement. The Fortas Case and the Struggle for the Supreme
Court. (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1972). 144.
3 John Massaro , "LBJ and the Fortas Nomination for Chief Justice," Political Science
Quarterly 97, no. 4. 605. (1982), accessed February 12, 2018.
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Supreme Court has a profound impact on American politics. The individual in this post serves
for life, just like his or her colleagues on the court. Their main power is to oversee the court
proceedings and, when in the majority, assign which justice will write the opinion on a given
case. The power to assign an opinion’s author allows the Chief Justice to, in a sense, manipulate
the court’s stance on a case. In confirming a nominee, the senate must be sure the nominee has
the best interest of the country’s legal system in mind and will uphold the principles and
traditions of the court as best they can. Sometimes, as seen with the Fortas case, there are snags
in the process, where nominees who are seen as shoo-ins for their positions end up not being
confirmed for any number of reasons.
The Fortas nomination is an interesting case because of all the moving parts and the
incredible amount of politicking which occurred. Scholars have “categorized the issues in the
Fortas case as falling into four groups: individual, institutional, ideological, and partisan”4. This
is the framework I will be using in my analysis as well. Beginning with the individual issues,
questions were raised about his relationships and dealings with questionable individuals during
his time as an Associate Justice. As a graduate of Yale Law School and a sitting justice on the
court, Fortas was most certainly qualified to be Chief Justice. Many letters were written to
endorse him for the post. The American Bar Association (ABA) in Chicago deemed Fortas
“highly acceptable from the viewpoint of professional qualifications”5. His record as a judge and
the fact that he was already an associate justice made him qualified in the eyes of the ABA. His
professional qualifications were never an issue for the senate, who asked further questions about
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Donald G. Tannenbaum. “Explaining Controversial Nominations: The Fortas Case Revisited”.
Presidential Studies Quarterly 17, no. 3. 574. (1987). Accessed March 22, 2018.
5 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Nominations of Abe Fortas and Homer
Thornberry: Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary. 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, 1-2.
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his professional qualifications and saw little issue with them. Where the senate saw issue was in
his personal dealings and friendship with president Lyndon Johnson. In many cases, “friendships
can come back to haunt justices”6, and Fortas’s relationship with Johnson is known as a major
contributing factor in his blocked nomination. Normally, friends trying to get someone a job ends
well, but in politics, it usually hurts more than it helps. During his confirmation hearing, it was
revealed that Fortas “regularly attended white house staff meetings; he briefed the president on
secret court deliberations; and, on behalf of the president, he pressured senators who opposed the
war in Vietnam”7. The relationship between both Johnson and Fortas led to several conflicts of
interest and was an overreach of power by the president. During his hearing, “Fortas faced sharp
questioning about both his judicial philosophy and his relationship with LBJ”8. Many felt as
though Fortas was nominated to serve as Chief Justice solely because of his relationship with the
president, and were trying to prevent the president from just nominating his friends for positions
which became available. Fortas was also under fire for his, arguably unethical behaviors, were
problematic and he was denied the post of Chief Justice, after senate Republicans filibustered the
vote of the senate. Fortas retired from the court in 1969, after “a scandal involving his
connections with a wealthy financier who had been convicted of securities fraud”9. This was an
ethical issue, which contributed to the derailment of the nomination. Institutional issues were
mainly rooted in the individual issues, but also stemmed from Johnson’s relative success in
appointing nominees for many offices. During his career in Washington, Lyndon Johnson “[rose]
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Ciara Torres-Spelliscy. “The Cautionary Tale of Abe Fortas,” Brennan Center for Justice NYU
School of Law. (February 6, 2018), accessed March 1, 2018.
7 Ibid.
8 Dion Farganis and Justin Wedeking. Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings in the US Senate.
Reconsidering the Charade. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014). 14.
9 Ibid.
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to national prominence by mastering the senate of the United States”10. Prior to his stint as Vice
President, leading to the presidency after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Johnson served
in senate leadership. He became a master of using politics in the senate to get what he wanted. In
fact, Johnson was known for his “great success in securing Senate approval of his nominations to
public office, including two Supreme Court justices”11. For Johnson, having a nominee not get
confirmed was an anomaly. After he announced that he was not seeking reelection, he asked the
senate for one last favor, to approve the nomination of Abe Fortas as Chief Justice. Fortas
received a hearing for his nomination in July of 1968. His hearing was filled with conflicting
opinions on several issues surrounding his fitness for the job and whether he could be nominated,
as there was no true vacancy on the court. With the Chief Justice’s retirement not taking effect
until after a successor had been appointed, considerable debate was held over whether he could
be replaced in the traditional way. The court still had a Chief Justice and no true vacancy, despite
Warren announcing his retirement. That question was answered swiftly and the senate deemed it
appropriate for the president to nominate a successor to the Chief Justice. During hearings,
nominees are questioned about their views on certain controversial cases and the decisions they
have made as a lower court judge (as many nominees are lower court judges prior to being
nominated to serve on the Supreme Court). This is where both the ideological and partisan
categories come into play. The purpose of this line of questioning by the Senate is to ensure the
nominee has the background to serve as a justice on the Supreme Court, will act in the best
interest of the country’s legal system, and fits the political interests of the country at the time. As
previously stated, Fortas’s education and experience made him qualified to serve in the position
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Shogan. A Question of Judgement. 143.
Tannenbaum. “Explaining Controversial Nominations: The Fortas Case Revisited”. 573.
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of Chief Justice. Ideologically speaking, he was a liberal. Appointed by Lyndon Johnson in 1965,
this was a given. Democratic senators were largely accepting of his views on pertinent issues, but
“conservative opponents…criticized Fortas’ liberal views on diplomatic and military
problems”12. This happens even today, where members of the other ideological group oppose a
nominee’s views on a set of issues. This is where the partisanship aspect comes into the picture.
Party line votes are common in confirmations of nominees, no matter the position. These factors
listed led to Fortas not being confirmed to the post of Chief Justice. Because Fortas was not
confirmed, Earl Warren still needed a successor. This job was left to Richard Nixon, the victor of
the 1968 election. Nixon appointed Warren Burger, a conservative, to serve as Chief Justice.
Burger served another 17 years and oversaw the country’s legal and systems move in a
more conservative direction. Since Burger’s appointment in 1969, the Chief Justice has been a
conservative. After his retirement in 1986, Burger was succeeded by William Rehnquist, a
conservative Associate Justice who had been elevated to that post. Rehnquist passed away in
2005 and John Roberts, another conservative, was appointed to fill the post and has been in the
position ever since. This line of conservative Chief Justices has had a profound impact on the
country’s legal system and has kept the majority on the court in their favor since 1969. The
conservative balance on the court was almost dismantled in 2016 with the death of Justice
Antonin Scalia, a prominent conservative. Before his death, the conservatives outnumbered the
liberals on the court by the slim margin of 5-4. With a Democratic president in office during the
last months of his presidency, and an impending presidential election, an important decision was
about to be made by the Republican controlled senate, either allow for the balance of the court to
tip the other direction or to hold out until after the election with the hope that a Republican
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Tannenbaum. “Explaining Controversial Nominations: The Fortas Case Revisited”. 574.

9
would win. Barack Obama, the sitting president chose to nominate District Court Judge Merrick
Garland as a successor for Scalia and the nomination was promptly filibustered by the senate.
Filibustering is a tactic used by Senators to stall discussions or a vote during their proceedings.
The 2016 nomination of Merrick Garland is another example of the political game played
by the senate during the nomination of justices. Here, the death of Justice Scalia forced Barack
Obama, a president in the final months of his administration, to make a nomination in an election
year. Knowing that Scalia, the justice whose seat needed to be filled, was a beloved conservative,
the president, a Democrat, chose to nominate a moderate federal judge named Merrick Garland.
Prior to Scalia’s death, conservatives outnumbered the liberals on the court 5-4. The nomination
of a liberal or even a left-leaning moderate, such as Garland, would have shifted the balance of
the court in favor of the liberals. With an election coming up, Majority Leader Mitch McConnell
and other Republicans in the senate “took a hard-line position against approving any replacement
Justice chosen by incumbent President Obama”13. They did this because they did not want to
shift the balance of the court, especially given the chance that a member of their party would be
elected president later that year. They held out hope that a Republican would win the 2016
election, nominate a conservative to the court, and maintain the balance of the court in the
conservative’s favor. Obama knew the political implications of the situation and made the
decision to nominate Merrick Garland, a district court judge in the District of Columbia, and a
left-leaning moderate. Moderates hold a unique position on the court. They can be, and often are,
the swing vote in certain cases where the court is otherwise split. Scalia was a staunch
conservative and the senate felt as though his replacement should be someone who shared the

13

J. Stephen Clark. “President Shopping for a New Scalia: The Illegitimacy of McConnell
Majorities in Supreme Court Decision-Making.” Albany Law Review 80, p. 745-746. (2016).
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same political views as he did. They also wanted only one swing vote on the court, Justice
Anthony Kennedy, who is a conservative. With this mindset and a new nominee to consider,
congress got to work in considering whether to give him a hearing. Unlike Fortas, Garland was
never given a hearing because senate Republicans felt as though “the American people should
have a voice in the selection of the next Supreme Court Justice”14. This was a viewpoint which
the Republicans held steady with during the entire process of waiting for Obama to leave office.
By doing this, the senate raised constitutional issues. Article 2 of the Constitution gives the
president power, “to nominate and by and with advice and consent of the senate, to appoint…
judges of the Supreme Court”15. The nomination of judge Garland to fill the vacancy on the court
was not an issue, as it was fully within Obama’s rights as president to do so. The constitutional
issue arose with the senate’s handling of the nomination. There is no prescribed timeline for
confirmation, and it is often done at the leisure of the senate. This is more of an issue than the
nomination itself. The senate knew this and let the nomination become null and void by holding
off until Obama left office. In the aftermath of this filibustered hearing, Republicans in the senate
got exactly what they wanted, a conservative to replace Justice Scalia on the court and to
maintain their majority for years to come. Donald Trump, the newly elected president, nominated
Neil Gorsuch and the rest is history. Like so many before him, Trump’s pick to serve on the
court will influence policy for decades to come. It remains to be seen how Justice Gorsuch will
impact the cases which will come through the court system in his lifetime, but it would be
interesting to speculate how they would be different had Garland been confirmed. One such
instance would be a shift in the balance of the court, from 5-4 in favor of the conservatives to 5-4
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for the liberals. This shift would have impacted the decisions in cases during this term, which
include questions on the right of association, free speech, and free exercise of religion. It would
be interesting to see how differently the court would rule on future cases if it had a liberal
majority instead of a conservative majority. The political ramifications of the Garland
nomination did not stop at the 2016 election. They extended into the confirmation process of his
successor, Neil Gorsuch.
The two cases, that of Fortas and that of Garland, are similar in many ways. Obviously,
they were both blocked nominations in election years. The election years play an important part
in each case. It is because the majority party in the senate, the Republicans in both instances,
wanted to wait and see if their party would win the presidency. Republicans won both the 1968
and 2016 elections, and the Republicans on the Senate got nominees who they felt would best
serve their interests. Additionally, they are similar in that the senate played a political game,
using their role in the confirmation process to their advantage in deciding appointments. The
senate judiciary committee confirmed the nomination of Fortas as Chief Justice, but his
nomination was not carried to a vote of the senate altogether. Republican senators wanted to hold
out until a new president was elected. In both cases, things worked in their favor. Had they not
worked in the Republicans’ favor, things would have been held up like the way they were in
2017 with the nomination of Neil Gorsuch, who was appointed to fill the spot Garland would
have, had he been confirmed.
As similar as these two cases are, they are also very different. For starters, the positions
which the two were nominated for are different. Fortas had been nominated to serve as Chief
Justice, and Garland had been nominated as an Associate Justice. The confirmation process for
Chief Justice can be much more stringent than that of the Associate Justices. This is due, in large
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part, to the influence which the Chief Justice has on the court and in the political system. The
Fortas nomination was held up on his personal dealings, political beliefs, and Lyndon Johnson’s
attempt to manipulate the system to get his people into office. This case also led to conservatives
taking the Chief Justice position and keeping it for decadesThe political gameplay in Fortas’
nomination was less about gaming the system to get a nominee which fits the political leanings
of the Senate than the Garland nomination did. Unlike Fortas, Garland did not even receive a
hearing for his nomination. The political gameplay was strong in the Senate, with his nomination
hearing being filibustered so he was not even granted a hearing due to an impending election
which could go either way. After Garland, there was more Senate gameplay, with rules being
changed to guarantee a confirmation, which will likely change Senate practices for Supreme
Court nominations moving forward. Lastly, it remains to be seen exactly what impact the
Garland nomination has on American history. This is due solely to how recently it occurred.
Merrick Garland being denied a hearing prior to the 2016 presidential election was not
the end of the saga of recent use of politics in nominations to the Supreme Court. Senate
Republicans are credited with blocking Garland’s nomination. Following the 2016 election, Neil
Gorsuch was nominated by Republican Donald Trump to fill the vacant seat on the Supreme
Court. Once Gorsuch was nominated, he received a hearing almost immediately. His hearing
lasted for many days, and Republicans, who held a majority in the senate, moved for a vote on
his confirmation. Senate rules state that a nominee must receive 60 votes to be confirmed. There
were not 60 Republicans in the senate, meaning they would either have to coalesce with the
Democrats to secure the proper number of votes, or change the rules to call for fewer votes for a
nominee to be confirmed. They did the latter and changed the rules to require a simple majority,
or 51 of 100 senators, for Gorsuch to be confirmed, because Democrats said they would not
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provide the correct number of votes needed for Gorsuch to be confirmed and threatened to
filibuster the vote on his confirmation. Before they could, however, the Republicans changed the
rules. Minority Leader Chuck Schumer acknowledged that “a filibuster of Gorsuch could result
in a wholesale change of senate rules, including the elimination of filibusters on Supreme Court
nominees.”16 By doing this, the senate would have to vote on each nominee. Filibusters were
eliminated for lower court nominees “in 2013, in the face of Republican obstruction.”17 The
filibuster is a tactic used to stall proceedings in order to delay a vote on a certain issue. In this
case, Senate Democrats threatened to play a political game with the goal of blocking Gorsuch’s
nomination because he did not have enough votes for confirmation. Limitations on filibustering
Supreme Court nominees, like the limitations placed on nominees to serve on lower courts, have
been one proposal for change in the confirmation process, which many argue needs reforming.
A proposal for change includes requiring a hearing for all nominees, regardless of
circumstances. As stated previously, nomination hearings are more than just a job interview for
these nominees, they are an opportunity to learn about the nominees for the Supreme Court and
determine if they will serve the people and government well. Through history, however, they
have become more of “a vapid and hollow charade”18. Confirmation hearings, as stated many
times before, can be used to the advantage of those in the Senate at the time. Senators game the
system to serve their interests, such as filibustering nominations in election years with the hope
of getting a member of their party elected president. The nomination and confirmation processes
themselves are not at issue in this case, but the manner in which the senate handles these
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Victor Li. “Democrats to filibuster Neil Gorsuch nomination to Supreme Court, Schumer
says.” ABA Journal.
17 Ibid.
18 Farganis and Wedeking. Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings in the US Senate:
Reconsidering the Charade. 7.
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confirmation hearings are. By manipulating the system during periods of political contention,
senators take the nomination power away from the president. He or she can still nominate
whomever they want, however the confirmation of those nominees is still subject to the politics
of the senate. A possible solution to this problem is to simply mandate that all nominees receive
a hearing by the senate. This proposal would guarantee that the nominees at least are being
acknowledged and are given a chance to be officially confirmed to the Supreme Court. This
would also help to curb the politicization which has crept into the confirmation hearings by
forcing senators, regardless of political affiliation, to put a hearing on their agenda. America’s
legal system would look different if this proposal were to be put into place. Gone would be the
days of the majority leaders of the senate effectively dictating who serves as a justice on the
Supreme Court. This would severely reduce the power of the majority leaders in these cases, thus
returning the power of confirmation back to the senate and hopefully making the process run
more smoothly. It would also eliminate the practice of filibustering Supreme Court nominations
by default, because a vote would be required. Unlike some, who feel as though term limits would
help curb this problem, I am not an advocate for term limits for Supreme Court justices, given
that they are some of the most brilliant minds in the country and politics needs to remain out of
their decisions once they clear the figurative hurdle that is the nomination process. Additionally,
this is not the question which needs to be addressed. Presently, the issue is getting the justices
onto the court, not what they do once they are there.
It is interesting that the Supreme Court has so much power and influence in the American
political system. A panel of nine individuals, who serve for life, hold the key to influence the
legal climate of the country, and this makeup is a combination of many individuals from
different walks of life, who have differing political views, and come from different eras in
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history. Regardless of their backgrounds, they were appointed to the court in the same way,
through the nomination process, a process which is supposed to be entirely apolitical, but is
based on so much more than professional qualifications. As seen throughout the different
nominations, the personal lives of nominees, political leanings, and which party controls the
senate plays a major role in whether a certain nominee becomes a justice. The process has
become politicized and it requires all parties involved to play a political game to get a nominee
confirmed. Nominating a justice is such an involved process because of the length of
appointments to the court and a president’s potential to influence legal decisions and
constitutional interpretation for decades after they leave office. Regardless of the potential for
influence, the senate considers more than just professional qualifications for nominees to serve as
Supreme Court justices. They are also willing to stop at nothing to ensure that they leave their
mark for decades after they leave office. The system of nominations needs to be changed to best
serve the constitutional intent of this process. In the cases covered in this piece, there were two
nominations which occurred in election years and involved an immense amount of politics.
When dealing with confirming individuals who make and rule on policies, no matter the
situation, politics and personal biases will creep in. The Supreme Court is no exception, and
nominees to serve here are vetted heavily and must pass through a rigorous nomination process
which includes several political factors that had otherwise not been intended by the writers of the
Constitution.
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